

LONDON BOROUGH OF CAMDEN	WARDS: All
REPORT TITLE: Work Programme and Action Tracker	
REPORT OF: Director of Property Management	
FOR SUBMISSION TO: Housing & Fire Safety Advisory Panel	DATE: 22 October 2024
<p>SUMMARY OF REPORT: This report provides an update on work programme of the Panel and an update on actions requested at previous meetings.</p> <p>Local Government Act 1972 – Access to information No documents that require listing were used in the preparation of this report.</p> <p>Contact Officer: Melissa Dillon, Resident Safety Engagement & Governance Lead. Tel: 0207 974 3100 melissa.dillon@camden.gov.uk</p>	
<p>RECOMMENDATIONS:</p> <p>The Panel is asked:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (i) To review the work programme for the remainder of the year set out at Appendix A and invited to consider what they would like to add to the 2025 work programme for their summer and autumn quarterly meetings. (ii) To note the action tracker at Appendix B (iii) To note the Grenfell Phase 2 Inquiry Report workstreams summarised at section 3 and the further detail in Appendix C. 	

Signed: 

Director of Property Management

Date: 10th October 2024

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 The current work plan for the Housing & Fire Safety Advisory Panel (HFSAP) is attached to this report as Appendix A.

2.0 REPORTS TO FUTURE MEETINGS

2.1 In 2025 formal quarterly meetings of the Panel are programmed for:

- 29th January 2025
- 23rd April 2025
- Summer 2025 date to be confirmed
- Autumn 2025 date to be confirmed

2.2 A report on the annual performance on the delivery of water, electrical and gas safety compliance in financial year 2023/24 is on the agenda of this meeting as part of the annual Fire and Building Safety Charter report. A report on leasehold property access options will come to the Panel at their January 2025 agenda.

2.3 Panel Members are invited to consider what they would like to add to the 2025 work programme for their summer and autumn quarterly meetings.

3.0 Grenfell Inquiry Phase 2 Report and Recommendations

3.1 On the 5 September 2024 the Grenfell Inquiry published the Phase 2 report and recommendations, the main findings of the report are summarised in this section. An executive summary and the full report can be accessed on the government website – [Publication of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry phase 2 report - GOV.UK \(www.gov.uk\)](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/grenfell-tower-inquiry-phase-2-report).

3.2 A cross departmental group met on 12 September 2024 to review the Phase 2 Inquiry report and the current position and considerations as set out in Appendix C. This led to the following workstreams being established:

- i. Design, technical requirements and contract management – looking at our design guides, employer’s requirements, procurement and contract management processes
- ii. Building control – a consideration of the Inquiry recommendations and points to raise in Government consultations
- iii. Landlord services and TMOs – a review of the Council’s TMO agreements and how duties are managed across the Council and by TMOs will be carried with reference to the Inquiry findings. The review will also pick up the broader points around oversight, landlord services and engagement in the Inquiry report.
- iv. Fire risk assessments – the Council will review current FRA arrangements with external specialist appointed to deliver the FRA programme for Council homes.

- v. Personal Emergency Evacuation Plans (PEEPs) – a working group will be set up to evaluate the work already underway to gather household information and undertake person centred fire risk assessments (PCFRAs). The group will evaluate how the Council would meet revised Government proposals as they are announced
- vi. Major incident plans – the Council will review the Inquiry findings and consider how these relate to the systems it already has in place and the changes that the Inquiry report has recommended.

3.3 A more detailed report will be brought forward to the Panel as the workstreams are progressed and the Government's approach is confirmed.

4.0 **Action Tracker**

4.1 An update on actions arising from the July 2024 meeting of the Panel is attached as Appendix B.

5.0 **COMMENTS OF THE BOROUGH SOLICITOR**

5.1 The Borough Solicitor has been consulted and has no legal comments to add.

6.0 **COMMENTS OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF CORPORATE SERVICES**

6.1 The Purpose of this report is to update the Panel on the work programme for the remainder of the year and to consider what to add to the 2025 work programme. There are currently no financial implications arising from this report.

6.2 Once the workstreams described in 5.1 and 5.2 have been developed further and an update report is created, any resource impacts of the recommendations will be considered at the time.

7.0 **ENVIRONMENTAL IMPLICATIONS**

7.1 There are none.

ENDS

APPENDIX A: WORK PLAN

29th January 2025

Leasehold Property Access Options
Annual report on work of the Panel
Compliance performance report (Standing item)
Work Programme

23rd April 2025

LFB Annual Report
Compliance performance report (Standing item)
Work Programme

Summer 2025

Resident/TRA training
Compliance performance report (Standing item)

Autumn 2025

Annual Fire & Building Safety Charter report 2024/25
Compliance performance report (Standing item)

ENDS

APPENDIX B: HOUSING AND FIRE SAFETY ADVISORY PANEL - ACTION TRACKER (July 2024)

Meeting	Item	Action	Action by	Status
18 th July 24	Fire Risk Assessments update	Officers would have the table in the report updated with the monthly statistics that were being provided to councillors.	Director of Property Management	Compliance report on the agenda has been updated

APPENDIX C: GRENFELL INQUIRY PHASE 2 REPORT - KEY RECOMMENDATIONS AND LBC CONSIDERATIONS

Inquiry Findings	Recommendation	Current LBC position / considerations
<p>Government & Regulatory Failings Arrangements under which the construction industry is regulated are too complex & fragmented.</p>	<p>Recommend government bring responsibility for functions relating to fire safety exercised by MHCLG/ Home Office & Dept Business & Trade into one department under a single Secretary of State</p>	<p>Actively monitor Government position.</p>
	<p>Recommend A Single Construction Regulator, reporting to a single Secretary of State be responsible for:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Regulation of construction products Development of suitable methods for testing construction products Testing and certification of such products issue of certificates of compliance of construction products Regulation and oversight of building control Licensing of contractors to work on higher-risk buildings Monitoring operation of Building Regulations & statutory guidance & advising SoS on need for change Carrying out research on fire safety in built environment Exchanging information with fire & rescue services on matters affecting fire safety Accrediting fire risk assessors Maintaining publicly available library of test data & publications. 	<p>Actively monitor Government position and continue to take part in MHCLG focus groups / early adopter meetings as they are convened.</p>
	<p>Recommend: Appointment of a Chief Construction Adviser to SoS to provide advice on all matters affecting construction industry & monitor all aspects of the department's work relating to the Building Regulations & statutory guidance</p>	<p>Actively monitor Government position and continue to take part in MHCLG focus groups/ early adopter meetings as they are convened.</p>
<p>Building Safety Act Definition of a 'higher risk' building currently limited to 7+ floors/18+m height. Inappropriate given likely presence of vulnerable people, for whom evacuation in the event of a fire or other emergency would present difficulty</p>	<p>Recommend Review definition of a higher risk building for the purposes of the Building Safety Act.</p>	<p>Strong Building Safety team in place comprising 10 Building Safety Managers plus team leader, and fire safety measures in place in compliance with Building Safety Act requirements. BSA currently applies to 188 residential HRBs in LBC management.</p> <p>Any expansion of the definition would need to be subject to a detailed impact assessment and cost analysis by Government.</p>

<p>Building Control Functions Criticism of deregulation & introduction into system of commercial interests.</p> <p>Private Sector Approved Inspectors have a commercial interest in conflict with role as guardians of the public interest. Competition for work between approved inspectors & local authority building control departments introduced a similar conflict of interest</p>	<p>Recommendation</p> <p>Government to appoint an independent panel to consider whether it is in the public interest for building control functions to be performed by those who have a commercial interest in the process. Panel to consider whether all building control functions should be performed by a national authority.</p>	<p>There is considerable inter borough / agency competition for Building Control professionals and a national authority may be the logical conclusion.</p>
<p>Dishonest Behaviour of Manufacturers</p> <p>It is essential that those responsible for designing buildings have access to reliable information about the materials and products they wish to use.</p> <p>Arconic Architectural Products: The cladding manufacturer marketed the cladding knowing it would be used on tall buildings, despite test evidence that it might be unsafe for this purpose.</p> <p>Rydon: Building & design contractor for the tower's refurbishment knew or should have known in 2015 that the cladding was flammable</p>	<p>Recommend That a construction regulator be responsible for assessing the conformity of construction products & issuing certificates. Copies of all test results be included in certificate. Manufacturers to provide construction regulator with full testing history of product or material to which certificate relates & inform the regulator of any material circumstances that may affect its performance, Manufacturers be required by law to provide on request copies of all test results that support claims about fire performance made for their products.</p>	<p>Rydon, Harley not utilised on current projects.</p> <p>While the Government has written to those firms still trading to inform them that they will be barred from award of Government contracts, the Council will require its own procurement advice.</p> <p>The Council has however made sure competent contractors appointed and suitable materials used on its remediation projects, including a commitment to an A1 fire rated façade at the Chalcots.</p>

<p>Harley Facades: fitted the flammable cladding claims it did not know the cladding had previously failed fire safety tests.</p> <p>Celotex and Kingspan: Insulation companies accused of ignoring safety risks in selling products for residential tower blocks. Insist their products could be used safely with the right designs</p> <p>Exova: Fire safety consultants advised refurbishment would have no adverse effect on safety.</p>		
<p>Failure of oversight & scrutiny by Kensington & Chelsea Council (RBKC)</p>	<p>Inquiry Panel content not to make further recommendations for action & to leave to implementation of the Social Housing (Regulation) Act 2023 & oversight of Regulator of Social Housing.</p>	<p>Current governance includes: <u>Officer Oversight</u> Landlord Compliance Group chaired by Director Property Management - monthly Housing & Safety Regulatory Board chaired by Executive Director Supporting Communities - monthly CMT Safety Board chaired by Chief Executive – quarterly <u>Public Reporting</u> Housing & Fire Safety Advisory Panel – quarterly compliance reporting and policy matters Housing Scrutiny Committee and Cabinet reports as and when required, for example the resident safety charter. Fire Risk Assessments (FRAs) and FRA actions monthly reporting to Panel & Scrutiny Committee members, publication on Council website</p>
<p>RBKC Response to Fire Residents were let down by RBKC as category 1 responders. RBKC failed to put</p>	<p>Civil Contingency Act/London Local Authority Gold Arrangements: Recommendation Guidance on the operation of Civil Contingency /Local Authority Gold arrangements be revised</p>	<p>The Council will consider recommendations linked to the Civil Contingencies Act/first responders (and any Council response) at its “Corporate Resilience Assurance Group”, this as part of a review that is already in progress.</p>

<p>in place suitable arrangements to discharge responsibilities under the Civil Contingencies Act or to train staff.</p>	<p>Existing and newly appointed chief executives & other staff be given regular training to ensure they are familiar with its principles.</p>	
<p>Landlord Failings & Poor Management by TMO Criticism of TMO for treatment of residents & poor landlord performance</p>	<p>Inquiry Panel content not to make further recommendations for action & to leave to implementation of the Social Housing (Regulation) Act 2023 & oversight of Regulator of Social Housing.</p>	<p>The Council will review its Tenant Management Organisations' adherence to statutory compliance and the management agreements in place.</p> <p>It is noted the TMOs in Camden have a much more limited remit than that of the Kensington and Chelsea TMO (KCTMO) which was more akin to an Arms-Length Management Organisation with full housing and property management responsibility. The Council will review the findings in relation to the KCTMO and consider it against its own practice.</p>
<p>Failure to keep records of vulnerable residents</p>	<p>Recommend: Owner/manager of every high-rise residential building be required by law to prepare personal emergency evacuation plans (PEEPs) for residents whose ability to evacuate the building without assistance may be compromised & include info in a premises information box for access by fire & rescue services</p> <p>Recommend that the advice contained in paragraph 79.11 of the Local Government Association Guide on PEEPS be reconsidered.</p>	<p>Residents have been asked to self-identify to the Council if they or a member of their household may need help to evacuate.</p> <p>Neighbourhood Housing Teams also undertake Tenancy checks and make referrals of vulnerable residents to Fire Safety Advisers for person centred fire risk assessments and/or to OT team for aids and adaptations. The new 100% internal stock condition survey also includes a question to identify potential vulnerabilities / evacuation requirements.</p> <p>For information storage on site, the Premises Information Box installation programme has completed. The housing transformation programme is evaluating the systems required to electronically store, produce and maintain this data.</p> <p>In terms of the Government's intended approach, the Building Safety Minister made a statement to Parliament on 2 September that plans for "residential PEEPS" are to be brought forward by Home Office in the Autumn.</p>

<p>TMO failure to maintain access to gas pipeline isolation valves Pipeline isolation valves are a critical part of the gas distribution network because they are intended to enable the supply of gas to be shut off quickly in an emergency</p>	<p>Recommend Every gas transporter be required by law to check accessibility such valves at least once every 3 years & report the results of that inspection to the HSE as part of its gas safety case review</p>	<p>LBC mechanical & electrical engineers carry out annual surveys on each of the gas transportation networks on Camden estates. Engineers ensure PIVs are clean & easily accessible in case of emergency</p> <p>All LBC gas networks have up to date line drawings /map with marked pipeline isolation valve locations marked on them. The line drawings have also been shared with Cadent and copies are also located within the meter rooms on estates.</p>
<p>Design & Technical & Contractual Practice for Refurbishment & Cladding Works Rydon Criticised for failings in its organisation of Grenfell Tower refurbishment. Including failure to make it clear which contractor was responsible for particular aspects of the design &a failure to take an active interest in fire safety.</p>	<p>Recommend: A licensing scheme operated by the (proposed) construction regulator be introduced for principal contractors wishing to undertake the construction or refurbishment of higher-risk buildings Recommend: It to be a legal requirement that any application for building control approval for the construction or refurbishment of a higher-risk building (Gateway 2) be supported by a personal undertaking from a director or senior manager of the principal contractor to take all reasonable care to ensure that on completion and handover the building is as safe as is required by the Building Regulations</p>	<p>Design team appointments & procurement processes to be reviewed.</p> <p>Will require amendment to new build design guides, employer’s requirements and scopes of service to make sure aligned.</p> <p>Will need amendments to the evaluation criteria and processes for contract award (for example the personal undertaking).</p>
<p>Criticism of lead architects with no experience of cladding/tower refurbishment or understanding of fire safety. Widespread failure of architects to investigate properly or understand the nature of the materials being chosen for cladding/fire safety purposes.</p>	<p>Architects and Principal Designers: Recommend That Architects Registration Board & Royal Institute of British Architects review the changes already in training & education of architects to ensure they are sufficient in the light of report findings. Recommend: A statutory requirement that an application for building control approval in relation to the construction or refurbishment of a higher-risk building (Gateway 2) be supported by a statement from a senior manager of the principal designer under the Building Safety Act 2022 that all reasonable steps have been taken to ensure that on completion the building as designed will be as safe as required by Building Regulations.</p>	<p>Design team appointments & procurement processes to be reviewed.</p>

<p>Fire Strategy</p>	<p>Fire engineers 113.24 Designing buildings that are safe in the event of a fire requires particular skill. It is a skill that can be acquired only by specialised education and experience worthy of formal recognition. The term “fire engineer” does not denote any formal qualification & it is possible for a person to practise as such without any formal qualification.</p> <p>Recommend that the profession of fire engineer be recognised/protected by law</p> <p>That an independent body be established to regulate the profession, define the standards required for membership, maintain a register of members & regulate their conduct.</p>	<p>LBC Fire Risk Assessments are carried out by Frankham Risk Management Services and are delivered by competent persons providing suitable and sufficient risk assessments in accordance with the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005.</p> <p>FRA's produced by Frankhams are reviewed and quality checked by LBC's in-house Fire Safety Adviser team and published on the Council's website.</p> <p>Design team appointments & procurement processes to be reviewed. In particular, amendments to scope of services required to reflect any changes to definition of Fire Engineer.</p>
<p>Fire Safety Strategies and Building Control Gateways.</p>	<p>Recommend that it be made a statutory requirement that a fire safety strategy produced by a registered fire engineer to be submitted with building control applications (at Gateway 2) for the construction or refurbishment of any higher-risk building and for it to be reviewed and re-submitted at the stage of completion (Gateway 3). Such a strategy must take into account the needs of vulnerable people, including the additional time they may require to leave the building or reach a place of safety within it and any additional facilities necessary to ensure their safety.</p>	<p>Design team appointments & procurement processes to be reviewed, including amendments to new build design guide, employer's requirements and scopes of service.</p>

ENDS